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Abstract
The monetary transmission mechanism plays an important role in studying
the persistent eﬀects of monetary policy. At least since Chari et al. (2000) it
is generally accepted that New Keynesian models of the business cycle display
a ‘persistence’ problem.
In this paper, we follow the approach of Walsh (2002) and include search
unemployment in diﬀerent speciﬁcations of a dynamic New Keynesian model
of the business cycle in order to study the eﬀects of a monetary shock. After
deriving the equilibrium solution of the model, we study the behavior of the
impulse response functions due to a monetary shock. To complete our analysis
we confront the results of our simulations to time series evidence for the U.S.,
U.K. and Germany.
Our main result is that the implementation of search unemployment does
improve the capability of the model to reproduce some stylized facts of the
monetary transmission mechanism, however, to a lesser degree than expected.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the study of dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium models of monetary economies. One main interest is to an-
alyze how the implementation of nominal rigidities in otherwise standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models can generate adjustment patterns, that means
impulse response functions, which are compatible to what have been found in the
data, for instance, by Christiano et al. (1999), Favero (2001) or Leeper et al. (1996).
These empirical studies suggest, that monetary disturbances generate inertial behav-
ior of inﬂation and persistence in aggregate quantities: the pattern of hump shaped
response of output and the gradual response of inﬂation are assessed as stylized facts
to be explained by a model (see, e.g. Fuhrer (2000)).1 While these rigidities seem to
be important to understand why monetary impulses do impact real variables in the
way described above, it is now well known, however, (see for instance Chari et al.
(2000)) that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with nominal rigidities
alone display a ‘persistence problem’, i.e. there is little persistence in the response
of real economic activity due to nominal shocks (Dotsey and King (2001)).
This is true as long as one abstains from assuming rigidities that are generally
considered as implausible. As spelled out by Bergin and Feenstra (2000), real eﬀects
in the data, tend to have longer life than can reasonably be assumed for the types
of rigidities on the real side of the economy.
As the addition of nominal rigidities to standard dynamic general equilibrium
models is not enough to reproduce the stylized facts, a modiﬁcation of the real
side of the model economy is indispensable.2 For instance, Christiano et al. (2001)
introduce habit persistence, adjustment costs in investment and variable capacity
utilization. Beside capital utilization, Dotsey and King (2001) concentrate on ‘a
substantial role’ for produced inputs and variations in labor supply. Both studies
1It is well known that dynamic models without nominal rigidities fail to reproduce these ad-
justment patterns (see Walsh (1998), chapters 2 and 3).
2That nominal rigidities might probably not be enough to explain the non-neutrality of money
has already been emphasized in a static environment by Ball and Romer (1990). They argue that
a plausible degree of nominal rigidity has to be supplemented by the existence of real rigidities.
Absent these real rigidities there is always a big incentive for the ﬁrm to adjust its nominal price
in response to an monetary impulse, because marginal costs are sensitive to movements in factor
demand and factor supply. See, for example, Gerke (2001) for an illustration. The elastic response
of output to demand without increased marginal cost is termed ‘real ﬂexibilities’ by Dotsey and
King (2001)
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succeed in improving the performance of the model to replicate salient features
of the monetary transmission process. Christiano et al. (2001) and the work of
Jeanne (1998) and Huang and Liu (2002) demonstrate that the conditions of the
labor market, especially the existence of wage rigidity, is likely to be crucial for the
question at hand.
The present paper also focusses on the labor market. In particular, we follow
Pissarides (1988) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) by assuming that labor can-
not be gratuitously and instantaneously reallocated across ﬁrms. Therefore, we
replace the frictionless labor market of the Walrasian model by introducing search
and matching frictions.3 In particular the work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994,
1999a) and Pissarides (2000) has emphasized that the manner by which workers seek
for jobs and ﬁrms look for new employees and the way how these agents are matched
together is likely to have an important role in the propagation of economic distur-
bances. Therefore, it has to be expected that the adjustment processes of aggregate
variables, following a real or nominal impulse, is, by some degree, determined by
how eﬃciently the labor market generates new job matches.
Following Walsh (2002), this paper attempts to bridge the gap between two
diﬀerent strands of the literature, the pioneering work of Langot (1995), Merz (1995)
and Andolfatto (1996) who study the implications of search and matching frictions
in the context of a standard Real Business Cycle Model, and Hairault and Portier
(1993), Yun (1996) or Chari et al. (2000) and others who focus on price stickiness and
monopolistic competition. The following analysis combines elements of both strands.
We evaluate the dynamic eﬀects of money growth shocks in a sticky price model
with two sided search in the labor market. The combination of these two strands
is potentially attractive because on the one hand the matching models based on
the work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999a) are able to replicate important
features of the business cycle, for instance the volatilities of job ﬂows.4 On the
other hand, the sticky price models only succeed to replicate the dynamic patterns
of output and inﬂation when prices are ﬁxed for a period of time which is not
in line with the empirical evidence. By implementing labor market search in a
sticky price model, we investigate whether the interplay of price stickiness and labor
3See, for instance, Mortensen and Pissarides (1999b) or Pissarides (2000) for an actual discussion
of search and matching models of the labor market.
4See, for example, Cole and Rogerson (1999) or Shimer (2003) for detailed evaluations of this
kind of model.
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market search improves the ability to account for the sluggish response of output
and inﬂation without relying on implausible calibration. The particular role of such
labor market frictions in the analysis of monetary policy shocks is already analyzed
by Cooley and Quadrini (1999) or Walsh (2002).
In this paper, we implement the basic approach of Merz (1995) into a framework
which is based on Ireland (1997). Complementary to the studies cited above, we
analyze the transmission mechanism of a monetary shock, when an aggregate capital
stock is included and a positive money demand function is motivated by a ‘money in
the utility function’ approach.5 Furthermore, we analyze the outcomes of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the household’s preferences.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two outlines the
market structure of the model. Section three presents the symmetric equilibrium of
our model. In section four we show the obtained impulse response functions of our
numerical simulations. Section ﬁve concludes.
2 The Model
Market structure of the model
The structure of our model builds on the seminal papers of Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987), Hairault and Portier (1993) and Ireland (1997). The modelling of the labor
market is based on Merz (1995). We assume that the economy consists of a represen-
tative household, a representative ﬁrm which produces a ﬁnal good, a continuum of
ﬁrms producing intermediate goods and a monetary authority. The ﬁnal good and
capital services are exchanged in perfectly competitive markets. On the other hand,
the intermediate goods and labor are traded under monopolistic competition and in
a process exhibiting search externalities for both households and ﬁrms, respectively.
These externalities arise because of trade frictions in the process in which house-
holds and ﬁrms exchange labor. In particular, the rate of contacts between ﬁrms
and workers depends on the number of traders on both sides of the labor market.
Furthermore, for each trader a positive externality exists if the number of traders
on the opposite side of the market increases. For example, if the number of vacant
jobs rises (decreases), an unemployed worker gets a new job with a higher (lower)
5For example, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and Walsh (2002) assume endogenous job creation
and destruction and motivate the money demand by cash in advance constraints.
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probability. According to Merz (1995), we distinguish between two kinds of search
processes. The ﬁrst one describes the search of an unemployed worker for a new job
at variable search intensities whereas the other one shows the ﬁrm oﬀering a new
job vacancy in order to create a new job. Both the search intensity and the creation
of new vacancies take time and consume real resources.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In a ﬁrst step, we outline the
structure of the labor market. Then we describe the behavior of the representative
household, the ﬁnal good ﬁrm, the intermediate goods ﬁrms and of the monetary
authority. In a last step we outline the interaction of intermediate goods ﬁrms and
the households, i.e. wage bargaining procedure.
The Labor Market
The economy’s labor force is assumed to be constant and is normalized to one. Let
nt denote the ratio of employed labor at time t, the unemployment rate follows
straightforward: ut = 1− nt.
At the aggregate level, employment evolves as
nt = (1− ψ˜)nt−1 + m˜t, (1)
where m˜t denotes the number of job matches and ψ˜ ∈ (0, 1) speciﬁes the exogenous
rate of job destruction. The number of job matches are generated by the so-called
matching function:6
m˜t = m˜(stut−1, vt), (2)
where st and vt denote the search intensity of an unemployed worker and the number
of vacancies posted by the intermediate goods ﬁrms, respectively. According to the
literature (see for example Blanchard and Diamond (1989) or Pissarides (2000)) we
assume that m˜t is linear homogeneous. This kind of matching function implies that
the following transition probabilities from unemployment to employment depend
only on the labor market tightness Θ˜t = vt/ut−1. These probabilities are deﬁned
as:7
p˜t =
m˜t(stut−1, vt)
stut−1
and q˜t =
m˜t(stut−1, vt)
vt
(3)
6An extensive discussion of the matching function can be found in Pissarides (2000) or Petron-
golo and Pissarides (2001).
7See, for example, Merz (1995), p. 274.
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It can be seen easily that the probability p˜t for an unemployed worker decreases
either by an increase in unemployment or search intensity. Furthermore, this prob-
ability increases by an increase in the market tightness which is driven by a higher
number of job vacancies. From the ﬁrm’s point of view, the opposite holds for
q˜t. According to Merz (1995) the total search eﬀort is deﬁned as the result of the
search intensity of the unemployed workers and the recruiting investments of the
intermediate goods ﬁrms. Both activities help to increase the employment and are
able to counteract the transition from employment to unemployment driven by the
exogenous destruction rate ψ˜. Once ﬁrms and workers met, they are engaged in a
Nash-bargaining process in order to set the wage rate (see below).
The household sector
We assume that the representative household consists of a large number of agents
who pool their income and provide each agent with a complete insurance against
variations in income due employment or unemployment. The household’s preferences
are deﬁned over consumption, labor and real cash balances, where the optimal tupel
is chosen with respect to a budget constraint. Preferences are described by the
following utility function:
U = Et
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nt−1,mt), (4)
where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes a constant discount factor, ct and mt = MtPt denote consump-
tion and real cash balances, respectively. We assume further, that the household
owns and accumulates the capital stock. Capital is rented to the intermediate goods
sector for a payment Ptrtkt−1 of nominal interest. The evolution of physical capital,
kt, is speciﬁed as
kt = (1− δ)kt−1 + It, (5)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and It denote the depreciation rate and the household’s investments,
respectively.
The number of agents employed in period t follows as:
nt = (1− ψ˜)nt−1 + p˜tstut−1. (6)
The budget constraint of the representative household is given by:
Pt(1+rt−δ)kt−1+Ptwtnt−1+Mt−1+τt+Πt = Ptct+Ptkt+Ptc(st)(1−nt−1)+Mt. (7)
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Furthermore, the household receives a lump-sum transfer τt paid by the government
and dividend payments from the continuum of intermediate goods producers, Πt =∫ 1
0
Πt(i)di. Pt denotes the price level and Mt and kt the amount of money and
capital, respectively, held by the household. c(st) describes the search costs of an
unemployed worker to ﬁnd a new job. Finally, the real wage wt results from a
bargaining process between ﬁrms and workers (see below). Given eqn. (4), the
households maximization problem follows as
max
ct,It,mt,st,kt,nt
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− nt−1,mt)
}
subject to the budget constraint and the evolution of employment, given by equa-
tions (7) and (6). The necessary ﬁrst order conditions are8
λt = uc(ct, 1− nt−1,mt) (8)
0 = ξt + β
[
λt+1rt+1 − ξt+1(1− δ)
]
(9)
λt = −ξt (10)
0 = −λtcs(st)− ζp˜t (11)
0 = ζt + β
[−un(ct+1,mt+1, 1− nt)
+λt+1(wt+1 + c(st+1))− ζt+1((1− ψ˜)− p˜t+1st+1)
]
, (12)
λt = um(ct, 1− nt−1,mt) + β λt+1
1 + πt+1
, (13)
where λt, ξt and ζt denote Lagrange multipliers. Taking equations (9) and (10) we
derive
−uc(ct, 1− nt−1,mt) + β
[
uc(ct, 1− nt−1,mt)(1 + rt+1 − δ)
]
= 0. (14)
With (10) and (11) we rewrite (8) into9
0 = uc(ct, 1− nt−1,mt)cs(st)
−β˜[−un(ct+1,mt+1, 1− nt) + uc(ct+1,mt+1, 1− nt)(wt+1 + c(st+1)) (15)
+
uc(ct+1,mt+1, 1− nt)cs(st+1)
Pt+1
(1− ψ˜ − p˜t+1st+1)
]
.
8Please note that all subscripts except t and t + 1 denote partial derivatives.
9Equations (14) and (15) are the analogue part of the household’s problem as in Merz (1995)
equations (H1) and (H2).
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The ﬁnal good sector
The ﬁnal good ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good, yt, by taking y(i) units of each inter-
mediate good i as input at each period t. The production process is described by
the following constant returns to scale technology
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, (16)
with θ > 1.
Equation (17) represents the respective maximization problem of the ﬁnal good ﬁrm:
max
yt(i)
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di, (17)
where Pt(i) denotes the price of the intermediate good (i). From (17) the demand
for the intermediate good results as
ydt (i) =
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt. (18)
Because of the zero proﬁt condition, the price level is determined as:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
. (19)
The intermediate goods sector
Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces a distinct good i ∈ [0, 1] with labor and
capital as inputs. These intermediate goods are imperfect substitutes and are sold
in a market under monopolistic competition. In each period t, the intermediate
goods producer chooses the number of job openings vt, labor of the next period nt,
the number of capital services supplied by the representative household and the price
Pt(i). Because of the matching process of the previous period t − 1 the number of
workers employed at time t is given. Furthermore, the ﬁrms and workers are engaged
in a wage bargaining process every period the job is productive. Analogue to Cooley
and Quadrini (1999) this wage setting procedure speciﬁes the hours worked in period
t. It is conceivable that the individuals of the economy work overtime if they observe
a positive shock.
According to Rotemberg (1982) each intermediate goods producer is faced with
a quadratic cost function which describes the adjustment of its nominal price. This
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cost function is expressed as
φP
2
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (20)
Equation (20) highlights the notion that price changes might have negative eﬀects
on customer - ﬁrm relationships. These negative eﬀects increase with the magnitude
of the price change and the level of economic activity. Besides the costs of adjusting
its nominal price, the intermediate goods producer also faces a linear cost function
when oﬀering new job vacancies avt, with a ≥ 0.
The production technology of the intermediate goods producer is assumed to be
of the following form:
yt(i) = f(zt, kt−1, nt−1) = zt
[
kt−1(i)
]α[
nt−1(i)
]1−α
. (21)
Note that the technology shock zt is given by a stationary stochastic process
log zt = (1− ψz) log z¯ + ψz log zt−1 + zt , (22)
with zt ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2z) and ψz ∈ [0, 1].
The optimization problem of the intermediate goods producers is to maximize
the present value of proﬁts10
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
λtΠt(i)
Pt
, (23)
where βtλt/Pt denotes the marginal utility value of the representative household of
an additional unit of proﬁts during period t. The nominal proﬁts of ﬁrm i, Πt, are
deﬁned as:
Πt(i) = Pt(i)yt(i)− Ptwtnt−1 − aPtvt − Ptrtkt−1(i)− PtφP
2
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (24)
Equation (23) is maximized subject to the following constraints:
yst (i) = zt
[
kt−1(i)
]α[
nt−1(i)
]1−α
=
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt = y
d
t (i) (25)
nt = (1− ψ˜)nt−1 + q˜tvt, (26)
10Note that βtλt is a stochastic discount factor (pricing kernel). See Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992), p. 1160 and 1168.
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where (25) follows from eqns. (18) and (21). Equation (26) denotes the evolution
of employment from the ﬁrm’s perspective. We obtain the following ﬁrst order
condition for the intermediate goods ﬁrms:
λtrt = νtfk(kt−1(i), nt−1(i), zt) (27)
χt = −aλtq˜−1t (28)
0 = χt + β
t
[−λt+1wt+1 + νt+1fn(kt(i), nt(i), zt+1)− χt+1(1− ψ˜)] (29)
0 = λt(1− θ)
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ yt
Pt
− λtφP
[ Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− 1
] yt
Pt−1(i)
(30)
+νtθ
[Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1 yt
Pt
+ βEt
{
λt+1φP
[Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− 1
]
yt+1
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)2
}
,
where νt and χt denote the respective Lagrange multipliers. In the case of a sym-
metric equilibrium, i.e. if Pt = Pt(i), it follows from eqn. (30) that λt/νt ≡ µt, which
represents the markup of the monopolistic ﬁrm. Furthermore, it can be shown for
φP = 0 that the markup is constant, i.e. µt = θ/(θ− 1) (See Ireland (1997), p. 90).
The monetary authority
The monetary authority determines the money supply of the economy. In every
period t, nominal money supply grows at an exogenous rate gt, i.e. Mt = (1 +
gt)Mt−1. The newly created money is paid to the household as a lump-sum transfer.
The transfer satisﬁes:
τt = Mt −Mt−1 (31)
By the deﬁnition of the growth rate of money, real balances (mt ≡ Mt/Pt) can be
expressed as
mt =
1 + gt
1 + πt
mt−1, (32)
where πt denotes the inﬂation rate at time t. With g¯ as the steady state growth rate
of money, we deﬁne ω¯t = gt − g¯ as the deviation of the growth rate from its steady
state. According to Walsh (1998) ω¯ is formulated as a stochastic process11
ω¯t = ψω¯ω¯t−1 + φzzt−1 + ω¯t , (33)
with ψω¯ ∈ (0, 1] and ω¯t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2ω¯). Furthermore, it is assumed that the
individual knows about the realization of ω¯t and zt when choosing its optimal values
of consumption, leisure, real balances and capital in period t.
11See Walsh (1998), p. 69. Note further that eqn. (33) is expressed in logs.
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Wage setting
Once ﬁrms and workers meet, the wage is negotiated according to a Nash bargaining
procedure. During this process ﬁrms and workers are considered as monopolists
earning an economic rent if a job becomes productive. Therefore, this bargaining
scheme allocates the rent surplus of a productive job between ﬁrms and workers.12
For a worker j who matches to a ﬁrm i, the value of a job is given by the real wage
wj,i,t net costs of search and disutility of work. On the other hand, the ﬁrm’s value
of a ﬁlled job follows from the diﬀerence between a worker’s marginal product, the
wages and the ﬁrm’s advertising costs.
The net surplus of the household is given by
W h = wt + c(st)− unt−1(ct,mt, 1− nt−1) +
cs(st)
p˜t
(1− ψ˜ − p˜tst).
Note that the household’s surplus consists of the wage rate, the search costs of
the actual and the next period net the disutility of work. The net surplus of the
intermediate goods producers follows as13
W f = fn(·)− wt + a
q˜t
(1− ψ˜).
The Nash bargaining criterion is given by
wt = argmax
(
W h
)ξ˜(
W f
)1−ξ˜
, (34)
where ξ˜ denotes the bargaining strength of the worker. The wage results analogue
to Cheron and Langot (2000):
wt = ξ˜
[ 1
µt
fn(kt, nt−1, zt) + aΘ˜t
]
+ (1− ξ˜)[unt−1(·)
λt
− c(st)
]
. (35)
As in Merz (1995) the wage results as a weighted sum of the marginal product of
labor net of advertising costs and the disutility of work corrected for foregone search
costs. Comparing equation (35) to the wage setting in the Real Business Cycle
models of Merz (1995) or Langot (1995), the only diﬀerence is the markup, due to
monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market.
12“Hence a realized job match yields some pure economic rent, which is equal to the sum of
the expected search costs of the firm and the worker. Wages need to share this economic (local
monopoly) rent, in addition to compensating each side for its costs from forming the job.” See
Pissarides (2000), p. 15.
13The ﬁrm’s and worker’s marginal values of employment are obtained by applying the enve-
lope theorem to the respective maximization problems. See e.g. Langot (1995) for an analogue
approach.
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3 Equilibrium Solution
In the symmetric equilibrium where
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)di = Pt the following conditions hold,
too: ∫ 1
0
nt−1(i)di = nt−1 (36)
∫ 1
0
kt−1(i)di = kt−1 (37)
∫ 1
0
yt(i)di = yt. (38)
Because of the equilibrium conditions given by eqns (36) to (38) the aggregate
resource constraint is given by
yt = ct + It + c(st)(1− nt−1) + avt + φP
2
( Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
yt (39)
An equilibrium of this economy is a set of variables
Ωt =
{
kt, nt−1, st, p˜t, q˜t, m˜t, vt, ut−1,mt, µt, ct, yt, It, rt, wt, Θ˜t, πt, zt, ω¯t
}
with the following properties: equations (8) to (13) determine the solution of the
household’s maximization problem. Furthermore, equations (27) to (30) solve the
problem of the intermediate goods ﬁrms. The remaining equations (1), (2), (3), (5),
(21), (22), (32), (33), (35) and (39) and the deﬁnition of the labor market tightness
Θ˜t = vt/(1− nt−1) close the model.
In order to calibrate the model we assume the following speciﬁcations:14
yt(i) = zt
[
kt−1(i)
]α[
nt−1(i)
]1−α
(40)
m˜t =
stut−1vt[
(stut−1)λ˜ + vλ˜t
] 1
λ˜
(41)
Model-I: u(ct,mt, nt−1) =
(
ctm
b1
t
)1−Φ1
1− Φ1 −
n1−ν1t−1
1− ν1 (42)
Model-II: u(ct,mt, nt−1) =
((
b2c
ν2
t + (1− b2)mν2t
) 1
ν2
)1−Φ2
1− Φ2 −
n1−η2t−1
1− η2 (43)
c(st) = c0 · sη˜t . (44)
14Note, that the utility functions assumed for our calibration experiments model diﬀer in the
way that the ﬁrst one, eqn. (42), forces the income and interest rate elasticities of money demand
to be equal while the second one, eqn. (43), does not (cf. Walsh (2003), p. 69).
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In determining the matching function (41) we follow den Haan et al. (2000) in order
to ensure that the matching probabilities, p˜t and q˜t are bounded in an interval
between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the speciﬁcation of the utility function is taken
from Fischer (1979) and Walsh (1998), respectively. The household’s search eﬀort
is modelled according to Merz (1995).
In order to simulate the model we follow Uhlig (1999) and log-linearize the sys-
tem around its steady state and solve the system by the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients.
4 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
We begin with the calibration of the model. Table 1 below reports the parameter
speciﬁcation we applied in our numerical simulations:
Table 1: Parameter Speciﬁcation
Model - I
N¯ U¯ Z¯ α δ β R¯ η˜
0.95 1− N¯ 1 0.30 0.025 0.99 1/β 1.0
c0 ψ˜ λ˜ ξ˜ a
¯˜Θ b1 ν1
0.005 ¯˜M/N¯ 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.20 0.005 -1.25
g¯ Φ1 ψz ψω¯ φ σz σω¯ θ
1.0125 0.5 0.95 0.5 -0.15 0.007 0.00216 6
µ¯ π¯ φP S¯
θ/(θ − 1) g¯ − 1 3.95 1
Model - II
b2 ν2 η2 Φ2
0.94 -1.56 150 0.5
We assume a steady state employment ratio of N¯ = 0.95. The parameters that
describe ﬁrms’ recruiting costs and workers’ search costs are set analogous to Merz
(1995), c0 = 0.005 and a = 0.05. We assume linear search costs for the household
and set η˜ = 1, accordingly. In specifying the labor market properties we have to set
the parameter of the matching function λ˜, the market tightness Θ˜ and the bargaining
power of workers ξ˜. Setting λ˜ = 0.5 we obtain steady state ratios for p˜ and q˜ equal
12
to 0.48 and 0.10. Although these values are lower than reported by den Haan et al.
(2000) (p = 0.70/q = 0.12), they also seem reasonable.15 Θ˜ = 0.20 is set higher
as reported in the literature (e.g. Langot (1995): Θ˜ = 0.1044) but consistent with
empirical results for Germany. Setting ξ˜ = 0.5 ensures symmetric bargaining power
of ﬁrms and workers. The remaining parameter ψ˜ follows immediately from the
steady state condition. This approach ensures, from our point of view, a consistent
calibration of this model.16 The parameters ρ, δ and β are set according to the
business cycle literature (see e.g. Ireland (1997)). The remaining parameters are
speciﬁed according to Ireland (1997) and Walsh (1998). In particular, setting g¯ =
1.0125 ensures an annual growth rate of the money stock of 5%. Furthermore,
b = 0.005 restricts the ratio of the money stock per GDP to 20 %. The value of
φP = 3.95 ensures an amount of adjustment costs of 0.03% of GDP. We choose
ν = −1.25 and Φ = 0.5, which implies an intertemporal elasticities of labor and
consumption of 0.8 and 2.0, respectively. By assuming θ = 6 the markup is 20%.
The parameters ψz and ψu determine the autocorrelation of the technology and the
nominal shock. Furthermore, σz and σu denote the respective standard deviations
of these shocks.
For calibrating the second speciﬁcation our our model, the values of b2 = 0.94,
ν2 = −1.56, η2 = 1/50 are speciﬁed according to Chari et al. (2000), whereas
Φ2 = 0.5 is is set in accordance with the preceding calibration.
In the following, we present the obtained impulse response functions for the
Model-I speciﬁcation. We want to point out that both speciﬁcations show no qual-
itative diﬀerences, except that the magnitudes of the obtained impulse response
functions of the Model-II setup are somewhat higher than the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.17
Figure 1 shows the impulse response functions of employment, output and con-
sumption due to a positive shock in money.
15Following van Ours and Ridder (1992), p˜ < 0.5 indicates labor markets with a duration of
unemployment for more than 6 months. As reported by the OECD (2000) a duration of more than
6 months accounts for more than 55% of unemployed workers in Germany and France.
16For example, den Haan et al. (2000) set q = 0.70, p = 0.12 and ψ˜ = 0.10. Applying these
settings in our simulations we obtained no qualitative diﬀerences in our results.
17Selected impulse response functions of the Model-II speciﬁcation are shown in appendix A.
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Figure 1: Consumption, Output, Employment
Although the impact of a 1% increase in the growth rate of nominal money
supply is very low (×10−4), the response of y shows the expected hump- shaped
pattern, i.e. output does not react immediately. However, the output response is not
very persistent. Compatible with the speciﬁcation of the labor market, the impulse
response of employment displays a persistent reaction, due to the low value of ψ˜.
Interestingly, consumption and investment (see ﬁgures 1 and 2) react negatively in
response to the shock. This behavior can be explained by the existence of the costs
associated with the search eﬀort, i.e. the recruiting costs and the costs of price
adjustments (see the aggregate resource constraint, eqn. (39)).
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Figure 2: Real Cash Balances, Investment
A stark indication of the lack of signiﬁcant price sluggishness is visualized by the
strong response of inﬂation, which returns to the steady state value only one period
after the shock (see ﬁgure 3).
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Figure 3: Inﬂation
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Figure 4: Markup, Interest Rate, Real Wage
The immediate response of the intermediate goods producers is shown by the
adjustment pattern of the markup. Only one period after the impulse the markup
is back at its steady state value. This shows that the intermediate goods producers
have a strong incentive to adjust their prices. This also explains the immediate
response of inﬂation.
The response of the labor market to a monetary shock is reported by ﬁgures 5
to 7.
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Figure 5: Search Intensity, Job Vacancies
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Figure 6: Job Matchings, Tightness Θ˜
Regarding ﬁgures 5 and 6 we observe that households and ﬁrms increase their
search intensity or their number of job vacancies (ﬁgure 5). Furthermore, a similar
response is obtained for the number of matches and the labor market tightness
(see ﬁgure 6). We interpret these results, in line with ﬁgures 3 and 4, as a lack of
persistence.
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Figure 7: Matching probabilities, p˜, q˜
Considering ﬁgure 7 it can be seen that the probability for unemployed workers
to ﬁnd a job increases, whereas the probability of ﬁlling a vacant job decreases.
17
However, this last result may not be robust as slight variation in the intertemporal
elasticity of consumption, for example, ﬂips the chart. The lack of persistence
remains.
The displayed impulse response functions of output, employment, consumption
and investment are robust for a wide range of alternative parameter settings. The
same is true for the response of the markup, the interest rate, the real wage and
inﬂation. The notable exception is search intensity and vacancies which display a
persistent response when ψ˜ (the exogenous separation rate) converges to 1.
Furthermore, as pointed out in the preceding section, calibrating this model with
a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the household’s preferences analogue to Chari et al. (2000)
we found no qualitative diﬀerences in the obtained impulse response functions (see
appendix A).
In the remaining part of this work, we examine if the model is able to reproduce
stylized facts of the business cycle measured by correlation coeﬃcients and rela-
tive standard errors. Table 2 shows the correlation coeﬃcients obtained from the
calibrations.
Table 2: Correlations obtained from Calibrations
Model - I Model - II
y c u π v Θ˜ y c u π v Θ˜
y 1 0.84 -0.95 -0.29 0.10 0.19 1 0.96 -0.65 -0.45 0.01 0.11
c 1 -0.72 -0.13 -0.00 0.07 1 -0.40 -0.36 -0.04 0.02
u 1 0.56 -0.39 -0.47 1 0.65 -0.33 -0.47
π 1 -0.98 -0.99 1 -0.89 -0.94
v 1 1.00 1 0.99
Θ˜ 1 1
To complete our analysis, we compare the results of table 2 with time series
data for the U.S., U.K. and Germany.18 In particular, the stylized facts for the
U.S. and U.K. shown in table 3 reproduce the empirical correlations of inﬂation,
18All time series used in this examination are real quarterly time series data. For the U.S.
we applied data from 1964.2 to 1996.4, for the U.K. we used a data set from 1964.2 to 1997.1
and for Germany data are taken from 1964.2 to 1998.2. All time series are taken from the OECD
Main Economic Indicators and OECD Economic Outlook and Projections, published in the OECD
Statistical Compendium, CD ROM Rel. 2002 / 2. Before applying the HP -ﬁlter, the data were
detrended by the 16+ Population.
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unemployment and vacancies reported by Cheron and Langot (2000) or Millard
et al. (1999) very well.19
Table 3: Empirical Correlations
U.S. (1964.2-96.4) U.K. (1964.2-97.1)
y c u π v Θ˜ y c u π v Θ˜
y 1 0.96 -0.26 0.25 0.44 0.37 1 0.62 -0.56 -0.06 0.58 0.61
c 1 -0.12 0.16 0.27 0.21 1 -0.23 -0.31 0.18 0.21
u 1 -0.20 -0.76 -0.93 1 -0.16 -0.77 -0.91
π 1 0.20 0.19 1 -0.08 0.01
v 1 0.93 1 0.97
Θ˜ 1 1
Germany (1964.2-98.4)
y c u π v Θ˜
y 1 0.78 -0.48 -0.04 0.38 0.48
c 1 -0.23 -0.03 0.19 0.23
u 1 -0.03 -0.60 -0.91
π 1 -0.08 -0.01
v 1 0.90
Θ˜ 1
In a next step we examine if our model is able to reproduce the so-called ‘Dunlop-
Tharsis’ - Observation, i.e. we analyze the correlation between output and real wage
and real wage and employment, respectively.
Table 4: Correlations II
U.S.a Germanyb Model - I Model - II
corr(y, w) 0.21 / 0.04 0.39 0.99 0.98
corr(w, n) 0.08 -0.33 0.95 0.50
a
The empirical correlation coeﬃcients for the U.S. are taken from
Danthine and Kurmann (2002) and Cheron and Langot (2000), respec-
tively
b
Half yearly data, taken from OECD Economic Outlook, CD-Rom,
Rel. 2003.1., 1965.2-2002.2
19Some slight diﬀerences belong to diﬀerent time intervals considered in the above mentioned
articles.
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Comparing the empirical correlations with our model we conclude that most of
the correlation are qualitatively compatible with the data. However, quantitatively
there are some marked diﬀerences. For example, the negative correlation between
output and inﬂation is higher in absolute value compared to Germany and the U.K.
(note that this relation is positive for the U.S.). On the other side, the negative
correlation between vacancies and unemployment (Beveridge curve) is smaller than
the empirical ones. A prototypical Phillips curve relationship which is exhibited
in the empirical correlations is not present in the model. There, we reproduce the
ﬁndings of Cheron and Langot (2000) who report a positive (0.47) or even a low
negative correlation between inﬂation and unemployment.20 The result of table 4
is, that our model produces a much higher correlation between output and real
wage and output and employment, respectively, than it is reported by the data.21
Applying a utility function analogue to Chari et al. (2000) (Model-2), we found no
diﬀerent correlations between output and real wages but a lower correlation between
real wages and employment.
Finally, we compare in table 5 relative standard errors obtained from our numer-
ical simulations with results given by the related literature.
Table 5: Comparison of relative Standard Errors
Model - I Model - II Merz (1995) Langot (1995) Hairlaut and Cheron and U.S.ab
Portier (1993) Langot (2000)
σc/σy 0.46 0.38 0.30 0.79 0.32 0.69 0.74
σI/σy 4.15 4.06 2.97 1.66 4.85 3.98 4.79
σw/σy 0.59 0.84 0.31 0.27 — 0.90 0.44
σn/σy 0.48 0.15 0.42 0.32 0.84 0.92 0.92
σu/σy 9.17 2.94 5.85 0.53 — — 6.54
σv/σy > 10 > 10 4.68 1.24 — — 7.82
a
Own calculations, data taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995).
b
The U.S. data for σu/σy and σy/σy are taken from Langot (1995).
The relative standard errors of c and I are in line with the data. Furthermore,
the volatilities of w and n over- or understate the stylized facts for the U.S. , but
20See Cheron and Langot (2000), p. 375.
21The correlation coeﬃcients decrease to 0.72 and 0.48, respectively, if the workers bargaining
power, ξ˜, converges to 0. For the Model - II calibration the correlation coeﬃcients change to 0.97
and 0.39, respectively.
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considering the related literature our results slightly improve the RBC models with
search unemployment. Concerning the relative standard errors of u and v we over-
state the related literature as well as the empirical evidence of the U.S.. There only
the Model - II speciﬁcation produces a result (σu/σy = 2.94) which is in line with
the data.
In summary, we interpret the success of the model as mixed. Compared to
standard New Keynesian models of the business cycle with Walrasian labor markets
the model only slightly (if at all) improves. In some dimensions (see the responses
of consumption and investment in ﬁgures 1 and 2) the model is not in accordance
with empirical impulse response functions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced search unemployment into the framework of a dynamic
New Keynesian model of the business cycle. The main diﬀerence of this model to
the literature, for example Cheron and Langot (2000) or Walsh (2002), is that it mo-
tivates the price stickiness and the introduction of money diﬀerently. In particular,
we apply a ‘money in the utility function’ approach rather than assuming cash in
advance constraints. Furthermore, we assume exogenous job creation and destruc-
tion, whereas, for example, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) or Walsh (2002) model this
process endogenously.
However, the analysis of section four has shown that the obtained results are
compatible to the work of Walsh (2002) or Cheron and Langot (2000). The model
reproduces some stylized facts of the business cycle, e.g. a hump - shaped response
of output due to a shock in money growth or a Beveridge curve relation. On the
other hand, a Phillips curve relation is not reproduced by both versions of our model
(cf. table 2). Concerning the ‘Dunlop-Tharsis’-observation our model overstates the
correlation which is reported by the empirical literature. To analyze why other
models reproduce such a relation is left for future research.
Because of the high complexity of the model, further studies of the robustness
are necessary. For example, comparing the responses to a shock in technology and
comparing the results with the one of Walsh (2002), we observe a positive impact of
technology on employment, which is not compatible, for instance, to Walsh (2002)
(see ﬁgures 11 to 13 in appendix B). However, we observe a diﬀerent responses of
21
employment due to a shock in technology if we set Φ = 2.0 or Φ = 0.5, i.e. if we
decrease (increase) the intertemporal elasticity of consumption and furthermore, if
we assume diﬀerent utility functions.
Furthermore, a detailed empirical analysis is still missing. In particular, a com-
parison of empirical impulse response functions to the results of section four could
give further insights into the monetary transmission mechanism.
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A Calibration analogue to Chari et al. (2000)
The parameters of the utility function are set according to Chari et al. (2000):
b = 0.94, ν = −1.56, η = 1
50
,Φ = 0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
x 10−4 Impulse responses to a shock in money−growth    
Years after shock
Pe
rc
en
t d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
employment      
consumption     
output          
Figure 8: Output, Employment, Consumption
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Figure 9: Real Wage, Interest Rate, Markup
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B Impulse Responses to a Shock in Technology
Note that the impulse response functions shown in ﬁgures 10 and 11 results from
calibrations of the Model - I speciﬁcation whereas ﬁgures 12 and 13 presents the
results of the Model - II calibration.
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Figure 10: Impulse Responses (Model-I), Φ = 0.5
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses (Model-I), Φ = 2.0
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses (Model-II), Φ = 0.5
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Impulse responses to a shock in technology      
Years after shock
Pe
rc
en
t d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 st
ea
dy
 st
at
e
employment      
consumption     
output          
Figure 13: Impulse Responses (Model-II), Φ = 2.0
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